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First, we identify a property of branching-time frames that is equivalent to
AGM-consistency, which is deﬁned as follows. A frame is AGM-consistent
if the partial belief revision function associated with an arbitrary state-instant
pair and an arbitrary model based on that frame can be extended to a full be-
lief revision function that satisﬁes the AGM postulates. Second, we provide
a set of modal axioms that characterize the class of AGM-consistent frames
withinthemodallogicintroducedin[4]. Third, weintroducea generalization
of AGM belief revision functions that allows a clear statement of principles
of iterated belief revision and discuss iterated revision both semantically and
syntactically.
Keywords: branching time, belief revision, information, iterated belief revi-
sion, plausibility ordering.
1 Introduction
In [4] belief change over time was modeled by means of branching-time structures;
a corresponding modal logic with operators for next-time, information and belief
was proposedandsomeaspects of therelationshipbetweenthis logicand the AGM
theory of belief revision ([1]) were discussed. In this paper we establish a stronger
correspondence between the semantics of branching-time frames and AGM belief
revision and address the issue of iterated belief revision, both syntactically and
semantically.
1The addition of a valuation to a branching-time frame gives rise - for every
state-instant pair (ω,t) - to an “initial” belief set K (the agent’s beliefs at (ω,t))
and a partial belief revision function based on K (constructed from the agent’s
beliefs at the immediate successors of instant t and at state ω). We investigate
under what conditions such a partial belief revision function can be extended to
a full AGM revision function. We ﬁnd that a necessary and sufﬁcient condition
(when the set of states   is ﬁnite) is that there exist a total pre-order R of   that
rationalizes belief revision at (ω,t), in the sense that both at instant t and at its
immediate successors (and at state ω) the states that the agent considers possible
are the R-maximal states among the ones that are compatible with the information
received. Wethenprovideasetofaxiomsthatcharacterizesthisclassofbranching-
time belief revision frames within the modal logic introduced in [4]. Finally, we
address the issue of iterated belief revision. First, we discuss the semantic and
syntactic modal correspondents of some well-known principles of iterated belief
revision. Then we introduce a generalization of AGM belief revision functions
that can be used to model iterated revision and show that every model based on
a rationalizable branching-time frame gives rise to such an iterated belief revision
function. One advantage of the iterated belief revision functions is that they allow
a precise formulation of what a doxastic state is and how an informational input
transforms a doxastic state into a new one.
2 Branching-time belief revision frames
The semantic frames discussed in this section provide a way of modeling the evo-
lution of an agent’s beliefs over time in response to informational inputs.
A next-time branching frame is a pair  T,֌  where T is a set of instants and
֌ is a binary relation on T satisfying the following properties: ∀t1,t2,t3 ∈ T,
1. if t1 ֌ t3 and t2 ֌ t3 then t1 = t2,
2. if  t1,...,tn  is a sequence in T with ti ֌ ti+1, for every i = 1,...,n − 1,
then tn  = t1.
The interpretation of t1 ֌ t2 is that t2 is an immediate successor of t1 or t1
is the immediate predecessor of t2: every instant has at most a unique immediate
predecessor but can have several immediate successors. If t ∈ T we denote the set
of immediate successors of t by t֌, that is, t֌ = {t′ ∈ T : t ֌ t′}.
A branching-time belief-information frame is a tuple  T,֌, ,{Bt,It}t∈T 
where  T,֌  is a next-time branching frame,   is a set of states and, for every
t ∈ T,It andBt arebinaryrelationson ,theﬁrstrepresentinginformationandthe
2latterbeliefs. TheinterpretationofωItω′ isthatatstateω andtimet−accordingto
the information received − it is possible that the true state is ω′. On the other hand,
the interpretation of ωBtω′ is that at state ω and time t, in light of the information
received, the agent considers state ω′ possible (an alternative expression is “ω′ is a
doxastic alternative to ω at time t”). We shall use the following notation:
It(ω) = {ω′ ∈   : ωItω′} and, similarly, Bt(ω) = {ω′ ∈   : ωBtω′}.
Thus It(ω) is the set of states that are reachable from ω according to the relation
It and similarly for Bt(ω).
Deﬁnition 1 Abranching-timebeliefrevisionframeisaframe T,֌, ,{Bt,It}t∈T 
that satisﬁes the following properties: ∀ω ∈  ,∀t,t′,t′′ ∈ T:
1. Bt(ω) ⊆ It(ω)
2. Bt(ω)  = ∅
3. if t ֌ t′, t ֌ t′′ and It′(ω) = It′′(ω) then Bt′(ω) = Bt′′(ω)
4. if t ֌ t′ and Bt(ω) ∩ It′(ω)  = ∅ then Bt′(ω) = Bt(ω) ∩ It′(ω).
Property 1 says that information is believed and Property 2 that beliefs are
consistent. The two together imply that It(ω)  = ∅, that is, that information itself
is consistent.1
Property 3 requires that at any two instants that share the same immediate pre-
decessor, if information is the same then beliefs must be the same. That is, differ-
ences in beliefs must be due to differences in information.
Property 4 is called the ‘Qualitative Bayes Rule’ (QBR) in [4], based on the
followingobservation. Inaprobabilisticsetting, let Pω,t betheprobabilitymeasure
over a set of states   representing the agent’s probabilistic beliefs at state ω and
instant t, let F ⊆   be an event representing the information received by the agent
atalaterinstantt′ andletPω,t′ betheposteriorprobabilitymeasurerepresentingthe
revised beliefs at state ω and instant t′. Bayes’ rule requires that, if Pω,t(F) > 0,
then, for every event E ⊆  , Pω,t′(E) =
Pω,t(E∩F)
Pω,t(F) . Bayes’ rule thus implies the
following (where supp(P) denotes the support of the probability measure P):
if supp(Pω,t) ∩ F  = ∅, then supp(Pω,t′) = supp(Pω,t) ∩ F.
IfwesetBt(ω) = supp(Pω,t),F = It′(ω),witht ֌ t′,andBt′(ω) = supp(Pω,t′)
then we get Property 4. Thus in a probabilistic setting the proposition “at instant t
1Thus we rule out inconsistent information. As pointed out by Friedman and Halpern [11], it is
notclearhowonecouldbeinformedofacontradictionor, atleast, howonecouldtreatacontradiction
as information.
3the agent believes that φ” would be interpreted as “the agent assigns probability 1
to the set of states where φ is true”.
Figure 1 shows a branching-time belief revision frame. For simplicity, in all
the ﬁgures we assume that, for every instant t, the information relation It is an
equivalence relation (whose equivalence classes are denoted by rectangles) and the
belief relation Bt is transitive and euclidean2. An arrow from ω to ω′ means that
ω′ ∈ Bt(ω) (or ωBtω′, that is, ω′ is reachable from ω according to the relation Bt).
Note, however, that none of the results below require It to be an equivalence rela-
tion (in particular, veridicality of information is not assumed), nor do they require
























For example, in Figure 1 at state α and instant t3 the agent is informed that the
true state is either α, γ or ε (It3(α) = {α,γ,ε}) and (incorrectly) believes that
it is either γ or ε (Bt3(α) = {γ,ε}). At the next instant t4 (and still at state α)
2Bt is transitive if ω
′ ∈ Bt(ω) implies that Bt(ω
′) ⊆ Bt(ω); it is euclidean if ω
′ ∈ Bt(ω)
implies that Bt(ω) ⊆ Bt(ω
′). Property 1 of Deﬁnition 1 is usually referred to as seriality.
4the agent is now informed that the true state is either α or ε (It4(α) = {α,ε})
and forms the revised (and still incorrect) belief that the true state is ε. On the
other hand, t5 is an alternative next instant to t3 and at t5 (and still at state α)
the agent’s information is It5(α) = {α,δ} and she forms the revised (and now
correct) belief that the true state is α (Bt5(α) = {α}). Note that all the properties
of Deﬁnition 1 are satisﬁed. In particular the Qualitative Bayes Rule is satisﬁed
everywhere: sometimes vacuously (as is the case at state α and instants t3 and t5
where Bt3(α) ∩ It5(α) = ∅) and sometimes non-trivially (as is the case at state α
and instants t3 and t4 where Bt3(α) ∩ It4(α) = Bt4(α) = {ε}).
Next we relate branching-time belief revision frames to the AGM theory of
belief revision ([1]), which is reviewed in the following section.3
3 AGM belief revision functions
Let Φ be the set of formulas of a propositional language based on a countable set
S of atomic formulas.4 Given a subset K ⊆ Φ, its PL-deductive closure [K]PL
(where ‘PL’ stands for Propositional Logic) is deﬁned as follows: ψ ∈ [K]PL if
and only if there exist φ1,...,φn ∈ K (with n ≥ 0) such that (φ1∧...∧φn) → ψ is
a tautology (that is, atheoremof Propositional Logic). A set K ⊆ Φisconsistent if
[K]PL  = Φ (equivalently, if there is no formula φ such that both φ and ¬φ belong
to [K]PL). A set K ⊆ Φ is deductively closed if K = [K]
PL. A belief set is a set
K ⊆ Φ which is deductively closed.
Let K be a consistent belief set representing the agent’s initial beliefs and let
Ψ ⊆ Φ be a set of formulas representing possible items of information. A belief
revision function based on K is a function BK : Ψ → 2Φ (where 2Φ denotes the
set of subsets of Φ) that associates with every formula ψ ∈ Ψ (thought of as new
information) a set BK(ψ) ⊆ Φ (thought of as the revised beliefs).5 If Ψ  = Φ we
call BK a partial belief revision function, while if Ψ = Φ then BK is called a full
belief revision function.
Deﬁnition 2 Let BK : Ψ → 2Φ be a (partial) belief revision function and B∗
K :
Φ → 2Φ a full belief revision function. We say that B∗
K is an extension of BK if,
for every ψ ∈ Ψ, B∗
K(ψ) = BK(ψ).
3For a more detailed account see [12] or [10].
4Thus Φ is deﬁned recursively as follows: if p ∈ S then p ∈ Φ and if φ,ψ ∈ Φ then ¬φ ∈ Φ
and (φ ∨ ψ) ∈ Φ. The connectives ∧ and → are deﬁned as ususal: φ ∧ ψ
def
= ¬(¬φ ∨ ¬ψ) and
φ → ψ
def
= ¬φ ∨ ψ.
5In the literature it is common to use the notation K ∗ ψ or K
∗
ψ instead of BK(ψ), but for our
purposes the latter notation is clearer.
5Deﬁnition 3 A full belief revision function is called an AGM revision function if it
satisﬁes the following properties, known as the AGM postulates: ∀φ,ψ ∈ Φ,
(AGM1) BK(φ) = [BK(φ)]PL
(AGM2) φ ∈ BK(φ)
(AGM3) BK(φ) ⊆ [K ∪ {φ}]PL
(AGM4) if ¬φ / ∈ K, then [K ∪ {φ}]PL ⊆ BK(φ)
(AGM5) BK(φ) = Φ if and only if φ is a contradiction
(AGM6) if φ ↔ ψ is a tautology then BK(φ) = BK(ψ)
(AGM7) BK(φ ∧ ψ) ⊆ [BK(φ) ∪ {ψ}]
PL
(AGM8) if ¬ψ / ∈ BK(φ), then [BK(φ) ∪ {ψ}]
PL ⊆ BK(φ ∧ ψ).
AGM1 requires the revised belief set to be deductively closed.
AGM2 requires that the information be believed.
AGM3 says that beliefs should be revised minimally, in the sense that no new
formula should be added unless it can be deduced from the information received
and the initial beliefs.6
AGM4 says that if the information received is compatible with the initial be-
liefs, then any formula that can be deduced from the information and the initial
beliefs should be part of the revised beliefs.
AGM5 requires the revised beliefs to be consistent, unless the information φ is
a contradiction (that is, ¬φ is a tautology).
AGM6 requires that if φ is propositionally equivalent to ψ then the result of
revising by φ be identical to the result of revising by ψ.
AGM7 and AGM8 are a generalization of AGM3 and AGM4 that
“appliestoiterated changesofbelief. TheideaisthatifBK(φ)isa
revision of K [prompted by φ] and BK(φ) is to be changed by adding
further sentences, such a change should be made by using expansions
of BK(φ) whenever possible. More generally, the minimal change of
K to include both φ and ψ (that is, BK(φ ∧ ψ)) ought to be the same
as the expansion of BK(φ) by ψ, so long as ψ does not contradict the
beliefs in BK(φ)” ([12], p. 55; notation changed to match ours).
4 Branching-time models and AGM belief revision
We now return to the semantic structures of Deﬁnition 1 and interpret them by
adding a valuation that associates with every atomic proposition p ∈ S the set of
6Note that, for every formula ψ, ψ ∈ [K ∪ {φ}]
PL if and only if (φ → ψ) ∈ K (since, by
hypothesis, K = [K]
PL).
6states at which p is true. Note that, by deﬁning a valuation this way, we frame the
problem as one of belief revision, since the truth value of an atomic proposition
depends only on the state and not on the time.7
Let S be a countable set of atomic formulas and Φ the set of propositional
formulas built from S (see Footnote 4). Given a branching-time belief revision
frame F =  T,֌, ,{Bt,It}t∈T , a model based on (or an interpretation of) F
is obtained by adding to F a valuation V : S → 2  (where 2  denotes the set
of subsets of  ).8 Truth of an arbitrary formula φ ∈ Φ at state ω in model M is
denoted by ω |=M φ and is deﬁned recursively as follows:
(1) for p ∈ S, ω |=M p if and only if ω ∈ V (p),
(2) ω |=M ¬φ if and only if ω  |=M φ, and
(3) ω |=M (φ ∨ ψ) if and only if either ω |=M φ or ω |=M ψ (or both).
The truth set of formula φ in model M is denoted by  φ M; thus  φ M =
{ω ∈   : ω |=M φ}.
Deﬁnition 4 Given a model M =  T,֌, ,{Bt,It}t∈T,V  , a state ω ∈  , an
instant t ∈ T and formulas φ,ψ ∈ Φ we say that
• at (ω,t) the agent is informed that ψ if and only if It(ω) =  ψ M,
• at (ω,t) the agent believes that φ if and only if Bt(ω) ⊆  φ M.
Note that for information we require equality of the two sets (this corresponds
to the notion of ‘all the agent knows’: see [4] for a discussion and references),
while for belief we impose the standard requirement that Bt(ω) be a subset of the
truth set of a formula.
Given a model M and a state-instant pair (ω,t), according to Deﬁnition 4 we
canassociatewith(ω,t)abelief setanda(typicallypartial) beliefrevisionfunction
as follows. Let
KM,ω,t = {φ ∈ Φ : Bt(ω) ⊆  φ M}, (1)
denote the set of formulas that the agent believes at (ω,t), that is, his (initial)
belief set at (ω,t). It is straightforward to show that KM,ω,t is a consistent and
deductively closed set. Let
7In principle, the branching-time structures of Deﬁnition 1 can be used to describe either a sit-
uation where the objective facts describing the world do not change − so that only the beliefs of
the agent change over time − or a situation where both the facts and the doxastic state of the agent
change. In the literature the ﬁrst situation is called belief revision, while the latter is called belief
update (see [15]). We restrict attention to belief revision.
8If instead of belief revision we were interested in belief update (see Footnote 7), then we would




ψ ∈ Φ :  ψ M = It′(ω) for some t′ ∈ t֌￿
(2)
be the possible items of information that the agent might receive next time (that is,
at some immediate successor of t: recall that t֌ = {t ∈ T : t ֌ t′}). Finally let
BKM,ω,t : ΨM,ω,t → 2Φ be deﬁned as9
BKM,ω,t(ψ) =
￿




That is, if at the immediate successor t′ of t the agent is informed that ψ (It′(ω) =
 ψ M), then his revised belief set is given by the set of formulas that he believes
at (ω,t′): {φ ∈ Φ : Bt′(ω) ⊆  φ M}.
For example, consider amodel oftheframeillustratedinFigure1abovewhere,
for some atomic formulas p1, p2, p3 and q, V (p1) = {α,γ,δ} = It1(α), V (p2) =
{α,δ,ε} = It2(α), V (p3) = {α,γ,ε} = It3(α) and V (q) = {γ}. Then the
initial beliefs at (α,t0) are given by the (consistent and deductively closed) set
Kα,t0 = {φ ∈ Φ : β |= φ}. The set Ψα,t0 of potential informational inputs at
(α,t0) is rather small; for example, while p1,p2,p3 ∈ Ψα,t0, (p1 ∨ p2) / ∈ Ψα,t0.
Thus the associated belief revision function BKα,t0 is a partial function. As an
example we have that ¬q,p3 ∈ BKα,t0(p2); thus, since ¬q,¬p3 ∈ Kα,t0 the agent
initially believes both ¬q and ¬p3 and, upon being informed that p2 (at (α,t2)) she
revises her beliefs by maintaining the belief that ¬q but switching from believing
that ¬p3 to believing that p3. A natural question to ask is whether this partial belief
revision function is compatible with the AGM postulates, in the sense that there
exists a full belief revision function B∗
Kα,t0 that satisﬁes the AGM postulates and is
an extension of BKα,t0 (see Deﬁnition 2). In this case the answer is negative. This
can be proved as follows. To simplify the notation we shall drop the subscripts
a,t0; thus we write K instead of Kα,t0, BK instead of BKα,t0, etc. Suppose that
B∗
K is an AGM extension of BK. Then, since p2 ∈ BK(p1) and p2 ∈ BK(p2) (and
BK(p1) = B∗
K(p1) and BK(p2) = B∗
K(p2)) it follows that10
p2 ∈ B∗
K(p1 ∨ p2). (4)
Thus B∗
K((p1 ∨ p2) ∧ p2) = B∗
K(p1 ∨ p2).11 Since (p1 ∨ p2) ∧ p2 is equivalent to
p2, by AGM6 B∗
K((p1 ∨ p2) ∧ p2) = B∗
K(p2). Thus (since BK(p2) = B∗
K(p2))
9This function is well deﬁned because of Property 3 of Deﬁnition 1.
10This is a consequence of the following result, which is proved in the Appendix (Lemma 13). Let
K be a consistent belief set and BK : Φ → 2
Φ an AGM belief revision function. Let φ,ψ,χ ∈ Φ
be such that χ ∈ BK(φ) and χ ∈ BK(ψ). Then χ ∈ BK(φ ∨ ψ).
11Proof: by AGM1, B
∗
K(p1 ∨ p2) = [B
∗
K(p1 ∨ p2)]
PL. By AGM5, since (p1 ∨ p2) is not a
contradiction, B
∗
K(p1 ∨ p2)  = Φ. Thus, since p2 ∈ B
∗
K(p1 ∨ p2), ¬p2 / ∈ B
∗
K(p1 ∨ p2). Hence,
8B∗
K(p1 ∨ p2) = BK(p2). (5)
Since p3 ∈ BK(p2),12
[BK(p2) ∪ {p3}]
PL = [BK(p2)]
PL = BK(p2). (6)
Furthermore, by (5), p3 ∈ B∗
K(p1 ∨ p2). Since (p1 ∨ p2) is not a contradiction, by
AGM5 B∗
K(p1 ∨ p2) is consistent and thus ¬p3 / ∈ B∗
K(p1 ∨ p2). Hence, by AGM7
and AGM8, B∗
K((p1∨p2)∧p3) = [B∗
K((p1 ∨ p2) ∪ {p3}]
PL and, by (5), the latter
is equal to [BK(p2) ∪ {p3}]
PL which, in turn, by (6), is equal to BK(p2). Thus
B∗
K((p1 ∨ p2) ∧ p3) = BK(p2). (7)
Since (p1 ∨p2)∧p3 is equivalent to p3, by AGM6 B∗




K(p3) = BK(p2). (8)
Since B∗
K is an extension of BK, B∗
K(p3) = BK(p3). Thus it follows from (8)
that BK(p3) = BK(p2), yielding a contradiction, since ¬q ∈ BK(p2) but ¬q / ∈
BK(p3).
In view of the above example, a natural question to ask is whether there exists
a property of branching-time belief revision frames that guarantees that the partial
belief revision functions generated by models based on frames that satisfy that
property are compatible with the AGM postulates. The notion of compatibility
with the AGM postulates is made precise in the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 5 A branching-time belief revision frame F =  T,֌, ,{Bt,It}t∈T 
is AGM-consistent at (ω,t) ∈   × T if, for every model M =  F,V   based on
it the associated belief revision function BKM,ω,t (see (3) above) can be extended
(see Deﬁnition 2) to a full AGM belief revision function (see Deﬁnition 3).
We showed above that the branching-time belief revision frame illustrated in
Figure 1 is not AGM consistent at (α,t0).
The following proposition, which is proved in the Appendix, extends results
givenin[6]and[14]. NotethattheQualitativeBayesRule(Property4ofDeﬁnition
1) is crucial for the validity of Proposition 6.
by AGM7 and AGM8, B
∗
K((p1 ∨ p2) ∧ p2) = [B
∗








12It is sraightforward to show that, for every φ ∈ Ψ, BK(φ) is deductively closed.
9A total pre-order of   is a binary relation R ⊆   ×   which is complete
(∀ω,ω′ ∈  , either ωRω′ or ω′Rω) and transitive (∀ω,ω′,ω′′ ∈  , if ωRω′ and
ω′Rω′′ then ωRω′′). We shall interpret ωRω′ as “state ω is at least as plausible as
state ω′”. Given a total pre-order R of   and a subset E ⊆  , let13
bestR E
def
= {ω ∈ E : ωRω′, ∀ω′ ∈ E}.
Thus bestR E is the set of states in E that are most plausible according to R.
Proposition 6 Let F =  T,֌, ,{Bt,It}t∈T  be a branching-time belief revi-
sion frame (see Deﬁnition 1) where   is ﬁnite and let (ω,t) ∈   × T. Then the
following conditions are equivalent:
(a) F is AGM consistent at (ω,t).
(b) There exists a total pre-order Rω,t of   that rationalizes the agent’s beliefs
at t and at the immediate successors of t (and state ω) in the sense that
b1. Bt(ω) = bestRω,t It(ω), and
b2. for every t′ ∈ T such that t ֌ t′,Bt′(ω) = bestRω,t It′(ω).
(c) ∀u0,u1,...,un ∈ t֌ with un = u0 (recall that t֌ is the set of immediate
successors of t),
if Iuk−1(ω) ∩ Buk(ω)  = ∅, ∀k = 1,...,n,
then Iuk−1(ω) ∩ Buk(ω) = Buk−1(ω) ∩ Iuk(ω), ∀k = 1,...,n.
(PLS)
A frame that satisﬁes Property (b) of Proposition 6 is said to be rationaliz-
able at (ω,t) and we say that the total pre-order Rω,t rationalizes belief revi-
sion at (ω,t). The branching-time belief revision frame illustrated in Figure 1
is not rationalizable at (α,t0). In fact, suppose that there is a total pre-order Rα,t0
that satisﬁes (b.1) and (b.2). Let Pα,t0 be the corresponding strict order (thus
ωPα,t0ω′ if and only if ωRα,t0ω′ and not ω′Rα,t0ω). Then, since γ ∈ It1(α)
and Bt1(α) = bestRα,t0 It1(α) = {δ}, δPα,t0γ; similarly, since δ ∈ It2(α) and
Bt2(α) = bestRα,t0 It2(α) = {ε}, εPα,t0δ. Hence, by transitivity, εPα,t0γ. How-
ever, from Bt3(α) = bestRα,t0 It3(α) = {γ,ε} we get that γRα,t0ε, yielding
13In the literature sometimes the total pre-order is denoted by   and the set {ω ∈ E : ω  
ω
′,∀ω
′ ∈ E} is referred to as the set of maximal elements of E, while some other times the total
pre-order is denoted by ≤ and the set {ω ∈ E : ω ≤ ω
′,∀ω
′ ∈ E} is referred to as the set of
minimal elements of E. In order to avoid confusion, we denote the relation by R and refer to the best
elements of a set.
10a contradiction. Since the frame is not rationalizable at (α,t0), it follows from
Proposition 6 that it is not AGM-consistent at (α,t0), a fact that was proved di-
rectly above.
Property PLS of part (c) of Proposition 6 gives a necessary and sufﬁcient con-
dition for a branching-time belief revision frame to be rationalizable at (ω,t). To
verify that the frame of Figure 1 is not rationalizable at (α,t0) using this prop-
erty, let u0 = u3 = t1, u1 = t3 and u2 = t2. Then It1(α) ∩ Bt3(α) =
{γ}  = ∅, It3(α) ∩ Bt2(α) = {ε}  = ∅ and It2(α) ∩ Bt1(α) = {δ}  = ∅, but
Bt1(α) ∩ It3(α) = ∅ and thus Bt1(α) ∩ It3(α)  = It1(α) ∩ Bt3(α).
Deﬁnition 7 A frame is locally rationalizable if it is rationalizable at every state-
instant pair (ω,t); it is AGM-consistent if it is AGM consistent at every (ω,t).
Thus, by Proposition 6, a frame where   is ﬁnite is locally rationalizable if and
only if it is AGM-consistent.
In a locally rationalizable frame, for every state-instant pair (ω,t), belief revi-
sion can be rationalized by a plausibility ordering of the set of states, in the sense
that at t and at the immediate successors of t (and a state ω) the states that the
agent considers doxastically possible (that is, according to her beliefs) are the most
plausible amongtheonesthat are compatible withtheinformation received. Figure
2 shows a locally rationalizable (and thus AGM-consistent) branching-time belief
revision frame. For example, belief revision at (α,t0) is rationalized by the total
pre-order Rα,t0 generated by the strict total order βPα,t0δPα,t0γPα,t0α:
Rα,t0 = {(α,α),(β,α),(β,β),(β,γ),(β,δ),(δ,α),(δ,γ),(δ,δ),(γ,γ),(γ,α)}.
Remark 8 In a locally rationalizable frame, it is possible that, if t′ is an imme-
diate successor of t, the plausibility ordering of   at (ω,t′) is different from the
plausibility ordering at (ω,t). For example, in the frame of Figure 2 any total pre-
order that rationalizes belief revision at (α,t0) must be such that γ is strictly more
plausible than α,14 whereas any total pre-order that rationalizes belief revision at
(α,t2) must be such that α is strictly more plausible than γ.15 Thus the ranking of
α and γ is reversed upon moving from (α,t0) to (α,t2).
Note also that, for a given instant t, if ω and ω′ are different states the total
pre-order that rationalizes belief revision at (ω,t) may be different from the total
pre-order that rationalizes belief revision at (ω′,t). For example, in Figure 2,
14Because Bt1(α) = {γ} and It1(α) = {α,γ}.
15Because Bt3(α) = {α} and It3(α) = {α,γ}.
For example, belief revision at (α,t2) is rationalized by the total pre-order Rα,t2 =
{(α,α),(α,γ),(α,δ),(β,α),(β,β),(β,γ),(β,δ),(δ,δ),(δ,γ),(γ,γ)}, that is, by the stict total
order βPα,t2αPα,t2δPα,t2γ.
11any total pre-order that rationalizes belief revision at (β,t2) must be such that β
is strictly more plausible than δ,16 whereas any total pre-order that rationalizes








a b g d
a b
b d
a g g d
a g
b d
b g d a
Figure 2
Wenowturntoamodal-logiccharacterizationoflocallyrationalizablebranching-
time belief revision frames.
5 A temporal logic for belief revision
We brieﬂy review the modal language introduced in [4], which contains the fol-
lowing modal operators: the next-time operator  , the belief operator B, the in-
formation operator I and the “all state” operator A. The intended interpretation is
as follows:
16Because Because Bt3(β) = {β} and It3(β) = {β,δ}.
17Because Because Bt3(δ) = {δ} and It3(δ) = {β,δ}.
For example, belief revision at (β,t2) is rationalized by the total pre-order generated by the strict
total order βPβ,t2αPβ,t2γPβ,t2δ, while belief revision at (δ,t2) is rationalized the total pre-order
generated by the strict total order δPδ,t2βPδ,t2γPδ,t2α.
12 φ : “at every next instant it will be the case that φ”
Bφ : “the agent believes that φ”
Iφ : “the agent is informed that φ”
Aφ : “it is true at every state that φ”.
Fix a model M =  T,֌, ,{Bt,It}t∈T,V  , where V : S → 2  is a valua-
tion. Given a state ω, an instant t and a formula φ, we write (ω,t) |=M φ to denote
thatφistrueat(ω,t)inmodelM. Let φ M ⊆  ×T denotethetruthsetofφ,that
is,  φ M = {(ω,t) ∈   × T : (ω,t) |=M φ} and let  φ M,t ⊆   denote the set
of states at which φ is true at instant t, that is,  φ M,t = {ω ∈   : (ω,t) |=M φ}.
Truth at (ω,t) is deﬁned as usual for p ∈ S (where S is the set of atomic formulas),
¬φ and (φ ∨ ψ). For the modal formulas we have
(ω,t) |=M  φ if and only if (ω,t′) |=M φ for every t′ such that t ֌ t′
(ω,t) |=M Bφ if and only if Bt(ω) ⊆  φ M,t
(ω,t) |=M Iφ if and only if It(ω) =  φ M,t
(ω,t) |=M Aφ if and only if  φ M,t =  .
Note that, while the truth condition for the operator B is the standard one,
the truth condition for the operator I is non-standard: instead of simply requiring
that It(ω) ⊆  φ M,t we require equality: It(ω) =  φ M,t (for an explanation
see [4], where the role of the “all state" operator is also discussed). Note also
that, while the other modal operators apply to arbitrary formulas, the information
operator is restricted to apply only to pure Boolean formulas, that is formulas that
do not contain any modal operators.18 Pure Boolean formulas represent facts and
information is restricted to be about facts.
A formula φ is valid in a model if  φ M =   × T, that is, if φ is true at every
state-instant pair (ω,t). A formula φ is valid in a frame if it is valid in every model
based on it. A property of frames characterizes (or is characterized by) an axiom
if the axiom is valid in every frame that satisﬁes the property and, conversely, if
the frame violates the property then there is a model based on that frame and a
state-instant pair at which the axiom is falsiﬁed.
Let ♦ be an abbreviation for ¬   ¬ (thus (ω,t) |=M ♦φ if and only if




the formula (φ1 ∧ ... ∧ φm). In the following proposition (which is proved in the
Appendix) all the formulas are restricted to be pure Boolean, that is, formulas that
do not contain any modal operators.
18A similar (in fact, stronger) restriction is imposed in [16] in the context of dynamic doxastic
logic (p. 175).
13Proposition 9 The class of locally rationalizable branching-time belief revision
frames is characterized by the following axioms (in Axiom 5 we let φ0 = φn and
χ0 = χn):
1. Iφ → Bφ
2. Bφ → ¬B¬φ
3. ♦(Iψ ∧ Bφ) →  (Iψ → Bφ)
4a. (¬B¬φ ∧ Bψ) →  (Iφ → Bψ)













(Iφj → B(φj−1 → χj−1)) ∧ (Iφj−1 → B(φj → χj))
￿
Axiom 1 says that information is believed and Axiom 2 that beliefs are consis-
tent. Axiom3correspondstoProperty3of Deﬁnition1. Axioms4a and4b provide
a characterization of Property 4 of Deﬁnition 1 (the Qualitative Bayes Rule). Ax-
iom 5 characterizes Property PLS of Proposition 6.
6 Iterated belief revision in branching-time frames
Branching-time belief revision frames provide a natural setting for studying iter-
ated belief revision, that is, changes in beliefs prompted by a sequence of informa-
tionalinputs. Theanalysiscanbecarriedouteithersemantically,withintheclassof
branching-time frames, or syntactically, within the modal language of the previous
section; furthermore, the two approaches can be linked via axiomatic characteriza-
tion results. In this section we will brieﬂy discuss some of the principles of iterated
belief revision that have been proposed in the literature,19 while in the next section
we provide a generalization of AGM belief revision functions (see Deﬁnition 3)
that captures iterated revision and discuss the correspondence between branching-
time frames and iterated belief revision functions.
In a locally rationalizable frame the total pre-order associated with a state-
instant pair (ω,t) encodes both the agent’s initial beliefs and her disposition to
change those beliefs upon receipt of new information. This is what has been called
in the literature an epistemic or doxastic state (see, for example, [9], [17], [19]).
AGM-consistency (which, by Proposition 6, is equivalent to local rationalizability)
19The ﬁrst analysis of iterated belief revision using the branching-time frames introduced in [4]
was carried out by Zvesper [21].
14imposes only very weak restrictions on how the epistemic state of the agent can
change from (ω,t) to (ω,t′) when t′ is an immediate successor of t. The following
lemma (proved in the Appendix) identiﬁes one such restriction: if E ⊆ F ⊆   and
the agent’s beliefs when informed that F do not rule out E, then she will have the
same beliefs in the situation where she is immediately informed that E as in the
situation where she is ﬁrst informed that F and then she is is informed that E.20
Lemma 10 Let F =  T,֌, ,{Bt,It}t∈T bealocallyrationalizableframe. Fix
an arbitrary state ω ∈   and instants t,t1,t2,t3 ∈ T such that t ֌ t1 ֌ t2 and
t ֌ t3 (that is, t1 and t3 are immediate successors of t and t2 is an immediate
successor of t1). Then 21
if It3(ω) = It2(ω) ⊆ It1(ω) and Bt1(ω) ∩ It2(ω)  = ∅,
then Bt2(ω) = Bt3(ω). (REFweak)
Note that the clause Bt1(ω) ∩ It2(ω)  = ∅ is crucial: without it the lemma is
not true. Denote by REF the strengthening of REFweak obtained by dropping
the clause Bt1(ω) ∩ It2(ω)  = ∅. As before, let t,t1,t2,t3 ∈ T be such that
t ֌ t1 ֌ t2 and t ֌ t3 and let ω ∈  :
if It3(ω) = It2(ω) ⊆ It1(ω), then Bt2(ω) = Bt3(ω). (REF)
Property REF states that “since the subsequent evidence is more speciﬁc than
the initial evidence (that is, It2(ω) ⊆ It1(ω)), the later evidence washes away the
earlier evidence” ([17], p. 197). Figure 3 shows a locally rationalizable frame that
violates Property REF at (α,t).22 Consider a model based on this frame where,
for someatomicformulasp, q andr,  p  = {δ},  q  = {α,γ} = It2(α) = It3(α)
and  r  = {γ}. Then at (α,t) the agent’s disposition to revise her beliefs is
20In the following lemma, E = It2(ω) = It3(ω) and F = It1(ω). Note that, although
REFweak is a rather weak property and is implied by the AGM postulates, the underlying require-
ment for iterated belief revision is not uncontroversial: see, for example, [20] and [18].
21‘REF’ stands for ‘reﬁnement’ (of information). Property REFweak can be derived from the
Qualitative Bayes Rule (Property 4 of Deﬁnition 1) and the following property, introduced in [4]:
if t ֌ t1, t ֌ t3, It3(ω) ⊆ It1(ω) and Bt1(ω) ∩ It3(ω)  = ∅
then Bt3(ω) = Bt1(ω) ∩ It3(ω). (CAB)
PropertyCAB isvalid in everylocally rationalizableframeand, asshownin[5], itischaracterized
by the axioms
♦(I(φ ∧ ψ) ∧ Bχ) →  (Iφ → B ((φ ∧ ψ) → χ)) (K7)
♦(Iφ ∧ ¬B¬(φ ∧ ψ) ∧ B(ψ → χ)) →  (I(φ ∧ ψ) → Bχ) (K8)
22Belief revision at (α,t) is rationalized by the total pre-order generated by the strict total order
βPδPγPα, while belief revision at (α,t1) is rationalized by any total pre-order that contains the
strict component δPαPγ. Note that the ranking of α and γ has been reversed in moving from (α,t)
to (α,t1).
15such that, if informed that q (which is the case at (α,t3)) she will believe that
r. However, after being informed that (p ∨ q) (at (α,t1): It1(α) = {α,γ,δ} =
 p ∨ q ) her disposition changes and, if later she is informed that q (which is the
case at (α,t2)), she will believe that ¬r (despite the fact that information that q is















Although not implied by AGM-consistency, Property REF captures a prin-
ciple that is part of most well-known theories of iterated belief revision (see, for
example, [7], [8], [9], [13], [17]). It is shown in [21] that Property REF is charac-
terized by the following axioms:
A(ψ → φ) ∧ ♦(Iφ ∧ ♦(Iψ ∧ Bχ)) →   (Iψ → Bχ) Ref1
A(ψ → φ) ∧ ♦(Iψ ∧ Bχ) →   (Iφ →  (Iψ → Bχ)) Ref2
A further strengthening of REF is given by the following property, which
correspondstothepostulate‘Conjunction’ inNayaket al ([17], p. 203). It saysthat
if two sequentially received pieces of information are consistent with each other,
thentheyinducethesamebeliefsastheinformationconsistingof theirconjunction.
As before let t,t1,t2,t3 ∈ T be such that t ֌ t1 ֌ t2 and t ֌ t3 and let ω ∈  :
16if It2(ω) ∩ It1(ω)  = ∅ and It3(ω) = It2(ω) ∩ It1(ω)
then Bt2(ω) = Bt3(ω).
(REFstrong)
It is shown in [21] that Property REFstrong is characterized by the following
axioms:
¬A¬(ψ ∧ φ) ∧ ♦(Iφ ∧ ♦(Iψ ∧ Bχ)) →   (I(φ ∧ ψ) → Bχ) Ref3
¬A¬(ψ ∧ φ) ∧ ♦(I(φ ∧ ψ) ∧ Bχ) →   (Iφ →  (Iψ → Bχ)) Ref4
The rationale for Property REFstrong is that information should be treated
cumulatively in the sense that information that E followed by information that F
has the same effect on beliefs as information that E ∩ F (provided that E and F
are compatible, that is, that E ∩ F  = ∅).
Other principles of iterated belief revision that have been proposed in the liter-
ature have corresponding properties in branching-time belief revision frames and
can be characterized by modal axioms similar to the ones discussed above: see
[21]. Instead of continuing the discussion along these lines, in the next section we
go back to the relationship between branching-time frames and AGM belief revi-
sion functions and provide a generalization of the latter that can be used to discuss
principles of iterated belief revision.
7 Iterated belief revision functions
As in Section 3, let Φ be the set of formulas in a propositional language based on
the set S of atomic formulas. Recall that, given a belief set K ⊆ Φ, an AGM belief
revision function is a function BK : Φ → 2Φ that associates with every formula
φ ∈ Φ (thought of as new information) a revised belief set BK(φ) ⊆ Φ, satisfying
the AGM postulates (see Deﬁnition 3). Several authors have discussed whether
belief revision ought to be thought of as a unary operation (that is, a function tak-
ing an informational input φ ∈ Φ and producing a new belief set) or as a binary
operation (that is, a function taking a belief set K ⊆ Φ and an informational input
φ ∈ Φ and producing a new belief set).23 This is an issue that has been raised in
the context of iterated belief revision. We propose to model iterated belief revision
in terms of a three-argument function, that is, a ternary operation. As we shall see,
our proposed functions incorporate the belief revision operations suggested in the
literature and offer a clear way of stating principles of iterated revision.
Let H be the set of sequences in Φ. If h =  φ1,...,φn  ∈ H and φ ∈ Φ, we
denote the sequence  φ1,...,φn,φ  ∈ H by hφ. The empty sequence     is denoted
23See, for example, [17] and [19].
17by ∅ andis an element of H. We think of a sequence h as a history of informational
inputs received in the past and up to the moment under consideration. The ﬁrst
argument of our iterated belief revision functions is a history h. The need to take
into account the history of previous informational inputs has been noted in the
literature. For instance Rott ([19], p. 398) writes:
“We need to make room for a dependence of the revision function
not only on the current belief state, but also on the history of belief
changes (previous belief states as well as previous inputs).”
In a similar vein Nayak et al ([17], p. 202) write:
“It isconceivable that at two different times, t1 andt2, an agent has the
same set of beliefs but the relative ﬁrmness of the beliefs are different.
If the agent accepts the same evidence at t1 and t2, the resultant belief
sets would be different.”
Presumably, the difference the authors refer to is attributable to the fact that the
two different times t1 and t2 represent different ways in which the agent arrived at
the same set of beliefs, that is, different past histories.
Figure 4 illustrates this possibility by means of an AGM-consistent branching-
time frame.24 Consider a model based on this frame where, for some atomic for-
mulas m, p, q, r and s,  m  = {α,β,γ,δ,ε},  p  = {α,β,γ},  q  = {α,β,ε},
 r  = {α,γ,ε} and  s  = {α}. Then the agent has the same belief set at
(α,t1) and at (α,t2), namely the set K = {φ ∈ Φ : β |= φ}. However, the
same information (at the corresponding next instant), namely that r is the case
(It3(α) = It4(α) =  r ), leads to different beliefs: for instance at (α,t3) she be-
lievesthatswhileat(α,t4)believesthat¬s(Bt3(α) ⊆  s whileBt4(α) ⊆  ¬s ).
This difference in disposition to revise beliefs upon receiving information that r,
despite the same “initial” set of beliefs K, can be traced to the different informa-
tional history leading to K: the information history at (α,t1) is given by  m,p 
while the information history at (α,t1) is given by  m,q .
24It is straightforward to check that the frame of Figure 4 is locally rationalizable. For exam-
ple, belief revision at (α,t0) is rationalized by the total pre-order generated by the strict total order
δPα,t0βPα,t0αPα,t0γPα,t0ε, belief revision at (α,t1) is rationalized by the total pre-order gener-
ated bythestrict totalorder βPα,t1αPα,t1γPα,t1δPα,t1εandbelief revision at(α,t2) isrationalized
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The other two arguments in the iterated belief revision functions are a belief set
K ⊆ Φ and an informational input φ ∈ Φ. Let K be the set of deductively closed
sets of formulas.
Deﬁnition 11 An AGM iterated belief revision function is a function B : H×K×
Φ → 2Φ that satisﬁes the AGM postulates: ∀h ∈ H,∀K ∈ K,∀φ,ψ ∈ Φ
(AGM1) B(h,K,φ) = [B(h,K,φ)]PL
(AGM2) φ ∈ B(h,K,φ)
(AGM3) B(h,K,φ) ⊆ [K ∪ {φ}]PL
(AGM4) if ¬φ / ∈ K, then [K ∪ {φ}]PL ⊆ B(h,K,φ)
(AGM5) B(h,K,φ) = Φ if and only if φ is a contradiction
(AGM6) if φ ↔ ψ is a tautology then B(h,K,φ) = B(h,K,ψ)
(AGM7) B(h,K,φ ∧ ψ) ⊆ [B(h,K,φ) ∪ {ψ}]
PL
(AGM8) if ¬ψ / ∈ B(h,K,φ), then [B(h,K,φ) ∪ {ψ}]
PL ⊆ B(h,K,φ ∧ ψ).
As noted by Nayak et al ([17], p.196) the only restriction that the AGM pos-
tulates imply concerning iterated belief revision is the one given in the following
lemma, which is the counterpart of Lemma 10.
Lemma 12 Let B : H×K×Φ → 2Φ be an AGM iterated belief revision function.
Then,for every h ∈ H, K ∈ K, and φ,ψ ∈ Φ
19if ¬ψ / ∈ B(h,K,φ) then B(hφ,B(h,K,φ),ψ) = B(h,K,φ ∧ ψ). (9)
The antecedent of (9), namely ¬ψ / ∈ B(h,K,φ), says that ψ is compatible
with the revised belief set after information that φ, when the starting point is given
by informational history h and belief set K; the consequent says that the revised
belief set after the further information that ψ, with new starting point given by
the update history hφ and the revised belief set B(h,K,φ), coincides with the
revised belief set after information that (φ ∧ ψ), when the starting point is given
by informational history h and belief set K. In short: information that φ followed
by information that ψ produces the same beliefs as the “one step” information that
(φ ∧ ψ), provided that ψ is compatible with the revised beliefs after the ﬁrst piece
of information, namely φ.
(9) is the counterpart of the semantic property REFweak. The counterpart of
the strong version of this property, namely REFstrong is obtained by replacing the
clause ‘¬ψ / ∈ B(h,K,φ)’ with ‘(φ ∧ ψ) is a consistent formula’:25
if (φ ∧ ψ) is consistent, then B(hφ,B(h,K,φ),ψ) = B(h,K,φ ∧ ψ). (10)
A consequence of (10) is that the order in which two consistent items of infor-
mation are received is irrelevant:26
if (φ ∧ ψ) is consistent,
then B(hφ,B(h,K,φ),ψ) = B(hψ,B(h,K,ψ),φ).
(11)
However, (11) is weaker than (10); that is, it is possible for an AGM iterated belief
revision function to satisfy (11) but not (10).
Other principles of iterated belief revision that have been proposed in the liter-
ature can easily be stated by means of AGM iterated belief revision functions. For
instance, Darwiche and Pearl’s postulate DP2 ([9]; see also [17], p. 203) can be
stated as follows:
if (φ ∧ ψ) is inconsistent while each of φ and ψ is consistent,
then B(hφ,B(h,K,φ),ψ) = B(h,K,ψ).
25The counterpart of the intermediate property REF is: if ψ implies φ, then
B(hφ,B(h,K,φ),ψ) = B(h,K,φ ∧ ψ).
26Proof. Let (φ ∧ ψ) be a consistent formula. From (10) we get that B(hφ,B(h,K,φ),ψ) =
B(h,K,φ ∧ ψ). Similarly, B(hψ,B(h,K,ψ),φ) = B(h,K,ψ ∧ φ). Since (φ ∧ ψ) is equiva-
lent to (ψ ∧ φ), by AGM6 B(h,K,φ ∧ ψ) = B(h,K,ψ ∧ φ). Thus B(hφ,B(h,K,φ),ψ) =
B(hψ,B(h,K,ψ),φ).
20Rather than restating the various principles of iterated revision proposed in the
literature, we ﬁrst comment on the philosophical issue of how revision of belief
states should be modeled and then turn to the relationship between AGM iterated
belief revision functions and branching-time belief revision frames.
Several authors have convincingly argued that a belief state ought to be thought
of as comprising both the initial set of beliefs and the disposition to change those
beliefs upon receipt of new information. As Rott ([19], p. 398) puts it,
“an [AGM] revision function does not revise a belief state - let alone
reviseall possiblebelief states- but arevision functionisabelief state.
Actually, a revision function does not revise anything; in particular,
there are no primitive entities in the study of belief revision that could
be revised by such a function. Revision functions are themselves the
primitive entities of the theory of belief revision.”
Rott goes on to note that, if one accepts this point of view, then one faces the
problem of how to represent the revision of belief states:
“If unary revision functions are primitive and the appropriate formal
representation of doxastic states, how do they get revised by proposi-
tional inputs?” [ibidem]
We argue that the AGM iterated belief revision functions of Deﬁnition 11
provide an answer to this question. A belief state can be taken to be a triple
(h, K, b : Φ → 2Φ) where h is a history of previous informational inputs, K
is the current set of beliefs and b( )
def
= B(h,K, ) : Φ → 2Φ is the one-step revi-
sion function obtained from B : H × K × Φ → 2Φ by ﬁxing the values of h and
K. Upon receipt of information φ ∈ Φ, the initial belief state (h,K,b) is trans-
formed into the new belief state (h′,K′,b′) where h′ = hφ, K′ = B(h,K,φ) and
b′( ) = B(hφ,B(h,K,φ), ) : Φ → 2Φ.27
We now turn to the relationship between branching-time belief revision frames
and AGM iterated belief revision functions. For simplicity we will focus on rooted
branching-time frames where there is an instant t0 ∈ T, called the root, which has
no immediate predecessor and is a predecessor of every other instant (that is, for
every t ∈ T\{t0} there is a sequence  t0,t1,...,tn  in T such that tn = t and,
27Rott’s proposal in [19] is to deﬁne iterated belief revision functions as unary operations
∗ : H → 2
Φ taking sequences of input formulas into sets of beliefs. Such functions can be generated
by the functions of our Deﬁnition 11 as follows: (1) ﬁx a starting point (h,K), (2) obtain from the
sequence of input formulas  φi i=1,..,n the sequence  (hi,Ki) i=1,..,n where hi = hi−1φi and
Ki = B(hi−1,Ki−1,φi) and then (3) deﬁne ∗( φi i=1,..,n) = Kn.
21for every i = 1,...,n, ti−1 ֌ ti).28 Given a frame F =  T,֌, ,{Bt,It}t∈T 
and a valuation V : S → 2 , let M be the corresponding model. Then M gives
rise to a partial iterated belief revision function in a natural way. Associate with
every state-instant pair (ω,t) a history hM,ω,t and a belief set KM,ω,t by letting
(as before: see (1)) KM,ω,t = {φ ∈ Φ : Bt(ω) ⊆  φ M} and hM,ω,t be the
history of past informational inputs up to t, deﬁned as follows. Let  t0,t1,...,tn 
be the path from the root t0 to t and let  It0(ω),It1(ω),...,Itn(ω) . For every
i = 0,1,..,n, let Φi = {φ ∈ Φ, Iti(ω) =  φ M} and let hM,ω,t = ∅ (recall
that ∅ denotes the empty sequence) if Φi = ∅ for every i = 0,1,...n, otherwise
hM,ω,t =  φ1,...,φm (m ≤ n+1)whereφj isanarbitraryselectionfromΦj−1  =
∅. Finally, if φ ∈ Φ is such such that It′(ω) =  φ M for some t′ ∈ T such that
t ֌ t′, let B(hM,ω,t,KM,ω,t,φ) = {ψ ∈ Φ : Bt′(ω) ⊆  ψ M}.
As an illustration, consider a model M based on the frame of Figure 4 where,
for some atomic formulas m, p, q and r,  m  = {α,β,γ,δ,ε},  p  = {α,β,γ},
 q  = {α,β,ε} and  r  = {α,γ,ε}. For simplicity we drop the subscript M.
Then
hα,t0 =  m  Kα,t0 = {φ ∈ Φ : δ |= φ}
hα,t1 =  m,p  Kα,t1 = {φ ∈ Φ : β |= φ}
hα,t2 =  m,q  Kα,t2 = {φ ∈ Φ : β |= φ}
hα,t3 =  m,p,r  Kα,t3 = {φ ∈ Φ : α |= φ}
hα,t4 =  m,q,r  Kα,t4 = {φ ∈ Φ : γ |= φ}
andB(hα,t0, Kα,t0, p) = Kα,t1,B(hα,t0, Kα,t0, q) = Kα,t2,B(hα,t1, Kα,t1, r) =
Kα,t3 and B(hα,t2, Kα,t2, r) = Kα,t4.
By Proposition 6, the partial iterated belief revision function associated with
an arbitrary model based on a frame F =  T,֌, ,{Bt,It}t∈T  that is locally
rationalizable can be extended to a full AGM iterated belief revision function. One
can extend the analysis by adding to the AGM postulates appropriate postulates of
iterated belief revision and identifying properties of frames that are equivalent to
the existence of full AGM iterated belief revision functions that (i) satisfy those
additional postulates and (ii) extend the partial iterated revision functions obtained
by interpreting the given frames. We leave this project to future research.
28Ina general branching-time frame with no root, instead of identifying apast history with thepath
from the root to the instant under consideration one would consider a maximal chain of predecessors
of that instant.
228 Concluding remarks
The branching-time frames discussed in this paper provide a natural setting for a
discussion of belief change both semantically, in terms of property of frames, and
syntactically, in terms of modal axioms.29 Furthermore, a correspondence between
interpretations of branching-time frames and AGM belief revision functions can
also be established, thereby providing a link to the vast literature on belief revision
and iterated belief revision.
A Appendix
First we prove the following lemma (see Footnote 10).
Lemma 13 Let K be a consistent belief set and BK : Φ → 2Φ an AGM belief
revision function. Let φ,ψ,χ ∈ Φ be such that χ ∈ BK(φ) and χ ∈ BK(ψ). Then
χ ∈ BK(φ ∨ ψ).
Proof. First we show that
(φ → χ) ∈ BK(φ ∨ ψ). (12)
If ¬φ ∈ BK(φ∨ψ) then, since - by AGM1 - BK(φ∨ψ) is deductively closed and
¬φ → (φ → χ) is a tautology, (φ → χ) ∈ BK(φ ∨ ψ). If ¬φ / ∈ BK(φ ∨ ψ) then,
by AGM7 and AGM8, BK((φ∨ψ)∧φ) = [BK(φ ∨ ψ) ∪ {φ}]
PL, that is, for every
ξ ∈ Φ,
ξ ∈ BK((φ ∨ ψ) ∧ φ) if and only if (φ → ξ) ∈ BK(φ ∨ ψ). (13)
Since (φ ∨ ψ) ∧ φ is propositionally equivalent to φ, by AGM6 BK((φ ∨ ψ) ∧
φ) = BK(φ). Thus, using (13) and the hypothesis that χ ∈ BK(φ), we get that
(φ → χ) ∈ BK(φ ∨ ψ). A similar proof leads to
(ψ → χ) ∈ BK(φ ∨ ψ). (14)
From (12) and (14) and the fact that BK(φ ∨ ψ) is deductively closed we obtain
((φ → χ) ∧ (ψ → χ)) ∈ BK(φ ∨ ψ). (15)
Since ((φ → χ) ∧ (ψ → χ)) → ((φ ∨ ψ) → χ) is a tautology, it belongs to
BK(φ ∨ ψ). Hence, by (15), ((φ ∨ ψ) → χ) ∈ BK(φ ∨ ψ). By AGM2, (φ ∨ ψ) ∈
BK(φ ∨ ψ). Hence χ ∈ BK(φ ∨ ψ).
29For a different, but related, approach see [2] and [3]
23We now turn to the proof of Proposition 6. First we need some preliminary
deﬁnitions and results.
Deﬁnition 14 A choice structure is a triple   ,E,f  where   is a set, E ⊆ 2  is a
collection of subsets of   and f : E → 2  is a function that satisﬁes the following
properties: ∀E ∈ E, (1) f(E) ⊆ E and (2) if E  = ∅ then f(E)  = ∅.
Give a choice structure C =   ,E,f , a Hansson sequence in C is a sequence
 E0,...,En  (n ≥ 1) such that (1) En = E0 and, ∀k = 1,...,n, (2) Ek ∈ E and
(3) Ek−1 ∩ f(Ek)  = ∅.
The following result is due to Hansson ([14], Theorem 7, p. 455).
Proposition 15 Let C =   ,E,f  be a choice structure. The following are equiv-
alent:
1. there exists a total pre-order R ⊆   ×   such that , for every E ∈ E,
f(E) = bestR E
def
= {ω ∈ E : ωRω′,∀ω′ ∈ E},
2. for every Hansson sequence  E0,...,En  in C, Ek−1 ∩f(Ek) = f(Ek−1)∩
Ek, ∀k = 1,...,n.
As we shall see below, by Proposition 15 Property PLS of Proposition 6 guar-
antees the rationalizability of the beliefs at the immediate successors of an instant
t (and some state ω). However, our deﬁnition of local rationalizability includes the
initial beliefs, that is, also the beliefs at (ω,t). Thus a little more work needs to be
done in order to prove the equivalence of (b) and (c) of Proposition 6.
Deﬁnition 16 Given two choice structures C =   ,E,f  and C′ =   ,E′,f′ , we
say that C′ is a QBR-extension of C by the addition of O ⊆   (with O  = ∅) if (1)
E′ = E ∪ {O}, (2) f′ is an extension of f, that is, ∀E ∈ E, f′(E) = f(E) and (3)
∀E ∈ E, if E ∩ f′(O)  = ∅ then f(E) = E ∩ f′(O).
Lemma 17 Let C =   ,E,f  be a choice structure and C′ =   ,E′,f′ , a QBR-
extension of C by the addition of O ⊆  . Then the following are equivalent:
(A) if  E0,...,En  is a Hansson sequence in C then, ∀k = 1,...,n, Ek−1 ∩
f(Ek) = f(Ek−1) ∩ Ek;
(B) if  E′
0,...,E′






Proof. That (B) ⇒ (A) is obvious, since the set of Hansson sequences in C′
contains the set of Hansson sequences in C (they are those where E′
k ∈ E for all
k). Thus we only need to prove (A) ⇒ (B).
24Consider ﬁrst the case where, ∀E ∈ E, E ∩ f′(O)  = ∅. Then, by Deﬁnition
16 , f(E) = E ∩ f′(O), ∀E ∈ E. Deﬁne the following relation R′ on  : for
all x,y ∈  , xR′y if and only if either (1) x ∈ f′(O) or (2) x / ∈ f′(O) and
y / ∈ f′(O). Then R′ is a total pre-order30 and, furthermore, for every E ∈ E′,
f′(E) = bestR′ E.31 Thus, by Proposition 15, (B) holds.
SupposenowthatE∩f′(O) = ∅forsomeE ∈ E. LetE0 = {E ∈ E : E ∩ f′(O) = ∅}
and let  0 =
￿
E∈E0
E. Then  0 ∩ f′(O) = ∅. By Proposition 15 it follows from
(A)that there isa total pre-order R of   such that, for all E ∈ E, f(E) = bestR E.
Fix such a total pre-order R and deﬁne the following relation R′ on  :
R′ = (R ∩ ( 0 ×  0))
￿
{(x,y) ∈   ×   : x ∈ f′(O)} ￿
{(x,y) ∈   ×   : y ∈  \( 0 ∪ f′(O))}
(16)
That is, (i) the elements of f′(O) are the most plausible states, (ii) R′ coincides
with R on  0× 0 and (iii) the elements of  \( 0∪f′(O)) are the least plausible
states. We want to show that R′ is a total pre-order of   and is such that, for every
E ∈ E′, f′(E) = bestR′ E. If we establish this then, by Proposition 15, (B) holds.
Proof that R′ is complete. Fix arbitrary x,y ∈  . We need to show that
either xR′y or yR′x. If x ∈ f′(O) then, by (16), xR′y; similarly, if y ∈ f′(O)
then yR′x. If x,y ∈  0 then it follows from (16) and completeness of R. If
y ∈  \( 0 ∪ f′(O)) then, by (16), xR′y; similarly, if x ∈  \( 0 ∪ f′(O)) then
yR′x.
Proof that R′ is transitive. Fix arbitrary x,y,z ∈   and suppose that xR′y and
yR′z. We need to show that xR′z. If x ∈ f′(O), then, by (16), xR′z. Assume that
x / ∈ f′(O). Two cases are possible: (1) x ∈  0 and (2) x ∈  \( 0 ∪ f′(O)). In
Case 1, since xR′y, it must be that either (1a) y ∈  0 or (1b) y ∈  \( 0∪f′(O)).
In Case 1a, since yR′z, it must be that either z ∈  0, in which case xR′z by (16)
and transitivity of R, or z ∈  \( 0 ∪ f′(O)), in which case xR′z by (16). In
Case 1b, since yR′z by (16) it must be that z ∈  \( 0 ∪ f′(O)) and thus, by
(16), xR′z. Consider now Case 2, where x ∈  \( 0 ∪ f′(O)). Then, since xR′y,
it must be that y ∈  \( 0 ∪ f′(O)) and thus, since yR′z, it must be that also
z ∈  \( 0 ∪ f′(O)). Hence xR′z by (16).





′y; if y ∈ f
′(O) then yR
′x; if both x / ∈ f





Proof of transitivity. Fix arbitrary x,y,z ∈   and suppose that xR
′y and yR
′z. We need to show
that xR
′z. If x ∈ f
′(O), then xR
′z. If x / ∈ f
′(O) then, since xR
′y, it must be that y / ∈ f
′(O) and
thus, since yR
′z, it must be that also z / ∈ f
′(O). Thus xR
′z.
31By deﬁnition of R
′, bestR′   = f
′(O). Let E ∈ E. Then, since f(E) = E ∩ f
′(O) = E ∩
bestR′  , f(E) = bestR′E (recall that we are considering the case where, ∀E ∈ E, E ∩ f
′(O)  =
∅).
25Thus R′ is a total pre-order of  . It remains to show that, for every E ∈ E′,
f′(E) = bestR′ E. It is clear from (16) that f′(O) = bestR′   and thus f′(O) =
bestR′ O (since, by deﬁnition of choice structure, f′(O) ⊆ O ⊆  ). Thus we
only need to show that f(E) = bestR′ E for all E ∈ E. If E ∈ E0 (that is,
E ∩ f′(O) = ∅) then, since f(E) = bestR E, it follows from (16) that f(E) =
bestR′ E (since R′ and R coincide on  0 ×  0). Suppose, therefore, that E / ∈ E0,
that is, E ∩f′(O)  = ∅. Then, by Deﬁnition 16, f(E) = E ∩f′(O). Hence, since
f′(O) = bestR′   and bestR′   ∩ E = bestR′ E (because bestR′   ∩ E  = ∅), it
follows that f(E) = bestR′ E.
Proof of Proposition 6. Part 1: equivalence of (b) and (c). Fix a branching-
time belief revision frame  T,֌, ,{Bt,It}t∈T , an arbitrary state ˆ ω and an ar-
bitrary instant ˆ t. Condition PLS states that
∀t0,t1,...,tn ∈ ˆ t֌ with tn = t0 and n ≥ 1,
if Itk−1(ˆ ω) ∩ Btk(ˆ ω)  = ∅, ∀k = 1,...,n,
then Itk−1(ˆ ω) ∩ Btk(ˆ ω) = Btk−1(ˆ ω) ∩ Itk(ˆ ω), ∀k = 1,...,n.
(17)
Associate with (ˆ ω,ˆ t) the following choice structure C =   ,E,f : E =
{It(ˆ ω) : t ∈ ˆ t֌} and, for every E ∈ E, if E = It(ˆ ω) for some t ∈ ˆ t֌ then
f(E) = Bt(ˆ ω). Note that the function f is well-deﬁned because of Property 3 of
Deﬁnition 1. Then (17) can be rewritten as follows (see Deﬁnition 14):
for every Hansson sequence  E0,...,En  in C
Ej−1 ∩ f(Ej) = f(Ej−1) ∩ Ej, ∀j = 1,...,n.
(18)
Let C′ =   ,E′,f′  be the extension of C given by E′ = E ∪ {It(ˆ ω)} and
f′(It(ˆ ω)) = Bt(ˆ ω). Then, by Property 4 of Deﬁnition 1, C′ is a QBR extension
of C by the addition of It(ˆ ω) (see Deﬁnition 16). Thus, by Lemma 17, (18) is
equivalent to
for every Hansson sequence  E′
0,...,E′





j, ∀j = 1,...,n. (19)
By Proposition 15, (19) is equivalent to the existence of a total pre-order ˆ R ⊆
 ×  that rationalizes C′ and thus (by construction of C′) ˆ R that rationalizes belief
revision at (ˆ ω,ˆ t) (that is, (b) of Proposition 6 is satisﬁed).
Remark 18 The proofs of Proposition 15 and Lemma 17 do not require   to be
ﬁnite. Thus the equivalence of (b) and (c) of Proposition 6 holds also in the case
where   is inﬁnite.
26In order to prove the equivalence of (a) and (b) of Proposition 6 we need the
following.
Deﬁnition 19 A choice structure   ,E,f  (see Deﬁnition 14) is called a U-choice
structure (‘U’ because E contains the universal set  ) if (i)   ∈ E and (2) ∀E ∈ E,
E  = ∅.
A U-choice structure   ,E,f  is rationalizable if there exists a total pre-order
R of   such that, for every E ∈ E, f(E) = bestR E
def
= {ω ∈ E : ωRω′, ∀ω′ ∈
E}.
A U-choice structure   ,E,f  is AGM-consistent if, for every valuation V :
S → 2 , the (partial) belief revision function BK : Ψ → 2Φ where K = {φ ∈
Φ : f( ) ⊆ ||φ||}, Ψ = {φ ∈ Φ : ||φ|| ∈ E} and, for every φ ∈ Ψ, BK(φ) =
{ψ ∈ Φ : f(||φ||) ⊆ ||ψ||}, can be extended to a full AGM belief revision function.
The following proposition is proved in [6].
Proposition 20 A U-choice structure   ,E,f  with   ﬁnite is AGM-consistent if
and only if it is rationalizable.
A “pointwise” application of Proposition 20, with some appropriate modiﬁca-
tions of the choice structure associated with every state-instant pair (ω,t), yields a
proof of the equivalence between (a) and (b) of Proposition 6.
Proof of Proposition 6. Part 2: equivalence of (a) and (b). Fix a branching-
time belief revision frame  T,֌, ,{Bt,It}t∈T , with   ﬁnite. Fix an arbitrary
state ˆ ω ∈   and an arbitrary instant ˆ t ∈ T.
Associate with (ˆ ω,ˆ t) the following U-choice structure C =   ,E,f : E =
{ } ∪ {It(ˆ ω) : t ∈ ˆ t֌}, f( ) = Bˆ t(ˆ ω) and, for every E ∈ E\{ }, if E = It(ˆ ω)
for some t ∈ ˆ t֌ then f(E) = Bt(ˆ ω).32
By construction, (a) of Proposition 6 is equivalent to AGM-consistency of C
(see Deﬁnition 19).33
Next we show that (b) of Proposition 6 is equivalent to rationalizability of C.
Suppose that C is rationalizable and let R be a total pre-order of   that rationalizes
C. Then (b.2) of Proposition 6 holds by deﬁnition of C. Furthermore, Bˆ t(ˆ ω) =
f( ) = bestR  . Since Bˆ t(ˆ ω) ⊆ Iˆ t(ˆ ω), it follows that Bˆ t(ˆ ω) = bestR Iˆ t(ˆ ω)
and thus (b.1) holds. Conversely, let R be a total pre-order of   that satisﬁes (b.1)
32As noted bove, the function f is well-deﬁned because of Property 3 of Deﬁnition 1.
33Given an arbitrary valuation V : S → 2
 , the initial beliefs and the partial belief revision
function associated with (ˆ ω,ˆ t) coincide with the initial beliefs and the partial belief revision function
associated with C.




 0 ∩ f( ) = ∅. Deﬁne the following relation R′ on  :
R′ = (R ∩ ( 0 ×  0))
￿
{(x,y) ∈   ×   : x ∈ f( )} ￿
{(x,y) ∈   ×   : y ∈  \( 0 ∪ f( ))}.
(20)
Then R′ is a total pre-order of   (the proof is identical to that given in Lemma
17 for (16), replacing f′ with f and O with  ). We want to show that, for every
E ∈ E, f(E) = bestR′ E. It is clear from (20) that f( ) = bestR′  . Thus
we only need to show that f(E) = bestR′ E for all E ∈ E\{ }. If E ∈ E0
(that is, E ∩ f( ) = ∅) then, since f(E) = bestR E, it follows from (20) that
f(E) = bestR′ E (since R′ and R coincide on  0 ×  0). Suppose, therefore, that
E / ∈ E0, that is, E∩f( )  = ∅. Then, since f( ) = bestR′  , E ∩bestR′    = ∅
and thus E ∩ bestR′   = bestR′ E. By Property 4 of Deﬁnition 1 (the Qualitative
Bayes Rule), f(E) = E ∩ f( ).34 Thus f(E) = bestR′ E.
Since (a) of Proposition 6 is equivalent to AGM-consistency of C and (b) of
Proposition 6 is equivalent to rationalizability of C, the equivalence of (a) and (b)
follows from Proposition 20.
Proof of Proposition 9. It is shown in [5] that, for j = 1,2, Axiom j of
Proposition 9 characterizes Property j of Deﬁnition 1.
Next we show that Axiom 3 of Proposition 9 characterizes Property 3 of Deﬁ-
nition 1. Fix an arbitrary frame that satisﬁes Property 3 of Deﬁnition 1, namely if
t ֌ t′, t ֌ t′′ and It′(ω) = It′′(ω) then Bt′(ω) = Bt′′(ω). Fix arbitrary ˆ ω ∈  ,
ˆ t ∈ T and pure Boolean formulas φ and ψ and suppose that (ˆ ω,ˆ t) |= ♦(Iψ∧Bφ).
Then there exists a t′ such that ˆ t ֌ t′ and (ˆ ω,t′) |= Iψ ∧ Bφ, that is, It′(ˆ ω) =
 ψ t′ and Bt′(ˆ ω) ⊆  φ t′. We have to show that (ˆ ω,ˆ t) |=  (Iψ → Bφ). Fix an
arbitraryt ∈ T such that ˆ t ֌ tandsupposethat (ˆ ω,t) |= Iψ. ThenIt(ˆ ω) =  ψ t.
Since ψ is a pure Boolean formula, by Proposition 5 in [4],  ψ t′ =  ψ t. Hence
It′(ˆ ω) = It(ˆ ω) and thus, by Property 3 of Deﬁnition 1, Bt′(ˆ ω) = Bt(ˆ ω). Hence
Bt(ˆ ω) ⊆  φ t′. SinceφisaBooleanformula, φ t′ =  φ t,sothatBt(ˆ ω) ⊆  φ t,
that is, (ˆ ω,t) |= Bφ. Hence (ˆ ω,t) |= Iψ → Bφ and thus, since t was chosen arbi-
trarily with ˆ t ֌ t, (ˆ ω,ˆ t) |=  (Iψ → Bφ). Conversely, ﬁx a frame that violates
Property 3 of Deﬁnition 1. Then there exist ω ∈   and t,t1,t2 ∈ T such that
t ֌ t1, t ֌ t2, It1(ω) = It2(ω) and Bt1(ω)  = Bt2(ω). Without loss of general-
ity we can assume that
there exists an α ∈ Bt2(ω) such that α / ∈ Bt1(ω) (21)
34By deﬁnition of C, f( ) = Bˆ t(ˆ ω), E = It(ˆ ω) for some t such that ˆ t ֌ t and f(E) = Bt(ˆ ω).
By Property 4 of Deﬁnition 1, if Bˆ t(ˆ ω) ∩ It(ˆ ω)  = ∅ then Bt(ˆ ω) = Bˆ t(ˆ ω) ∩ It(ˆ ω).
28(otherwise renumber the two instants). Construct a model where, for some atomic
formulaspandq,  p  = It1(ω)×T and q  = Bt1(ω)×T. Then(ω,t1) |= Ip∧Bq
and thus, sincet ֌ t1, (ω,t) |= ♦(Ip∧Bq). Furthermore, since It1(ω) = It2(ω),
(ω,t2) |= Ip and, by (21), (ω,t2)   Bq, so that (ω,t2)   (Ip → Bq). Hence,
since t ֌ t2, (ω,t)    (Ip → Bq) and thus Axiom 3 is falsiﬁed at (ω,t).
It is shown in [5] that Axiom 4a of Proposition 9 (called ND in [5]) is charac-
terized by the following property
if t ֌ t′ and Bt(ω) ∩ It′(ω)  = ∅ then Bt′(ω) ⊆ Bt(ω) (22)
and Axiom 4b of Proposition 9 (called NA in [5]) is characterized by the following
property
if t ֌ t′ then Bt(ω) ∩ It′(ω) ⊆ Bt′(ω). (23)
Since Property 4 of Deﬁnition 1 implies both (22) and (23), it follows that a
frame that satisﬁes Property 4 validates Axioms 4a and 4b. Furthermore, in the
presence of Property 1 of Deﬁnition 1, the conjunction of (22) and (23) implies
Property 4. Thus, in the presence of Property 1, violation of Property 4 implies vi-
olation of either (22) or (23) (or both) and thus leads to the possibility of falsifying
either Axiom 4a or Axiom 4b (or both).
We conclude the proof of Proposition 9 by showing that Axiom 5 is character-
ized by Property PLS of Proposition 6. Fix a branching-time belief revision frame
that satisﬁes PLS, an arbitrary model based on it, arbitrary pure Boolean formulas
φ1,...,φn and χ1,...,χn and arbitrary ˆ ω ∈   and ˆ t ∈ T and suppose that (letting
φ0 = φn)








We have to show that, for every j = 1,...,n (letting φ0 = φn and χ0 = χn)
(ˆ ω,ˆ t) |=  
￿
(Iφj → B(φj−1 → χj−1)) ∧ (Iφj−1 → B(φj → χj))
￿
.
By (24) there exist t1,...,tn ∈ ˆ t֌ such that
(ˆ ω,t1) |= Iφ1∧¬B¬φn∧Bχ1 (recall that φ0 = φn) and
(ˆ ω,tj) |= Iφj∧¬B¬φj−1∧Bχj for all j = 2,...,n.
(25)
Thus
29(a) Itj(ˆ ω) =
￿ ￿φj
￿ ￿
tj for all j = 1,...,n,
(b) Btj(ˆ ω) ∩ Itj−1(ˆ ω)  = ∅ for all j = 2,...,n,
(c) Bt1(ˆ ω) ∩ Itn(ˆ ω)  = ∅
(d) Btj(ˆ ω) ⊆
￿ ￿χj
￿ ￿
tj for all j = 1,...,n.
(26)
Fix arbitrary j ∈ {1,...,n} and t ∈ T with ˆ t ֌ t. We have to show that if
(ˆ ω,t) |= Iφj then (ˆ ω,t) |= B(φj−1 → χj−1) and if (ˆ ω,t) |= Iφj−1 then (ˆ ω,t) |=










tj, so that, by (a)
of (26), It(ˆ ω) = Itj(ˆ ω). It follows from this and Property 3 of Deﬁnition 1, that
Bt(ˆ ω) = Btj(ˆ ω). Thus, without loss of generality, we can take t = tj. Similarly, if
(ˆ ω,t) |= Iφj−1 then, without loss of generality, we can take t = tj−1. Thus it will
be sufﬁcient to show that if (ˆ ω,tj) |= Iφj then (ˆ ω,tj) |= B(φj−1 → χj−1) and
if (ˆ ω,tj−1) |= Iφj−1 then (ˆ ω,tj−1) |= B(φj → χj). By (b) and (c) of (26) and
property PLS we have that (letting t0 = tn)
Itj−1(ˆ ω) ∩ Btj(ˆ ω) = Btj−1(ˆ ω) ∩ Itj(ˆ ω). (27)
By (d) of (26), Btj−1(ˆ ω) ⊆
￿ ￿χj−1
￿ ￿
tj−1 and, since χj−1 is a pure Boolean formula,











Hence, by (27) and (28),




Now (letting  E denote the complement E, that is,  E =  \E),
Btj(ˆ ω) ⊆  Itj−1(ˆ ω) ∪
￿



























￿ ￿φj−1 → χj−1
￿ ￿
tj ,thatis,(ˆ ω,tj) |= B(φj−1 → χj−1). Theproofthatif(ˆ ω,tj−1) |=
Iφj−1 then (ˆ ω,tj−1) |= B(φj → χj) is along the same lines. 35
Conversely, ﬁx a frame that violates property PLS. Then there exist ˆ ω ∈  ,
ˆ t ∈ T, t1,...,tn ∈ ˆ t֌, and a k∗ ∈ {1,...,n} such that (letting t0 = tn)
(a) Itk−1(ω) ∩ Btk(ω)  = ∅, ∀k = 1,...,n,
(b) Itk∗−1(ˆ ω) ∩ Btk∗(ˆ ω)  = Btk∗−1(ˆ ω) ∩ Itk∗(ˆ ω).
(32)
Let p1,...,pn,q1,...,qn, beatomicformulasandconstruct amodel where, for every
k = 1,...,n,  pk  = Itk(ˆ ω) × T and  qk  = Btk(ˆ ω) × T. Then, by (a) of (32)
(letting p0 = pn)








By (b) of (32), either
(A) there is an α ∈ Itk∗−1(ˆ ω) ∩ Btk∗(ˆ ω) such that α / ∈ Btk∗−1(ˆ ω) ∩ Itk∗(ˆ ω) or
(B) there is a β ∈ Btk∗−1(ˆ ω) ∩ Itk∗(ˆ ω) such that β / ∈ Itk∗−1(ˆ ω) ∩ Btk∗(ˆ ω).
Consider Case A ﬁrst. Since α ∈ Btk∗(ˆ ω) and, by Property 1 of Deﬁnition 1,
Btk∗(ˆ ω) ⊆ Itk∗(ˆ ω), it must be that α / ∈ Btk∗−1(ˆ ω), so that (α,t) |= ¬qk∗−1, for
every t ∈ T. Since α ∈ Itk∗−1(ˆ ω), (α,t) |= pk∗−1, for every t ∈ T. Thus (α,t) |=
¬(pk∗−1 → qk∗−1), for every t ∈ T, in particular (α,tk∗) |= ¬(pk∗−1 → qk∗−1).
Since α ∈ Btk∗(ˆ ω), it follows that (ˆ ω,tk∗) |= ¬B(pk∗−1 → qk∗−1), so that, since
(ˆ ω,tk∗) |= Ipk∗, (ˆ ω,tk∗) |= ¬(Ipk∗ → B(pk∗−1 → qk∗−1)). It follows from this
and the fact that ˆ t ֌ tk∗ that (ˆ ω,ˆ t) |= ¬   (Ipk∗ → B(pk∗−1 → qk∗−1)). This,
together with (33) falsiﬁes Axiom 5 of Proposition 9 at (ˆ ω,ˆ t).
Now consider Case B. Since β ∈ Btk∗−1(ˆ ω) and Btk∗−1(ˆ ω) ⊆ Itk∗−1(ˆ ω), it
must be that β / ∈ Btk∗(ˆ ω), so that (β,t) |= ¬qk∗, for every t ∈ T. Since β ∈
Itk∗(ˆ ω), (β,t) |= pk∗, for every t ∈ T. Thus (β,t) |= ¬(pk∗ → qk∗), for every t ∈
T, in particular (β,tk∗−1) |= ¬(pk∗ → qk∗). Since β ∈ Btk∗−1(ˆ ω), it follows that
(ˆ ω,tk∗−1) |= ¬B(pk∗ → qk∗), so that, since (ˆ ω,tk−1∗) |= Ipk∗−1, (ˆ ω,tk∗−1) |=
¬(Ipk∗−1 → B(pk∗ → qk∗). It follows from this and the fact that ˆ t ֌ tk∗−1 that
(ˆ ω,ˆ t) |= ¬ (Ipk∗−1 → B(pk∗ → qk∗)). This, together with (33) falsiﬁes Axiom
5 of Proposition 9 at (ˆ ω,ˆ t).
35By (d) of (26) Btj(ˆ ω) ⊆
￿ ￿χj
￿ ￿












tj−1. Since Btj−1(ˆ ω) ⊆  Itj(ˆ ω) ∪
￿
Itj(ˆ ω) ∩ Btj−1(ˆ ω)
￿


























31Proof of Lemma 10. First we prove that every locally rationalizable frame
satisﬁes Property CAB (see Footnote 21) and then show that Property CAB, to-
gether with the Qualitative Bayes Rule (Property 4 of Deﬁnition 1) implies Prop-
erty REFweak. Fix ω ∈   and t,t1,t3 ∈ T such that t ֌ t1, t ֌ t3, It3(ω) ⊆
It1(ω) and Bt1(ω)∩It3(ω)  = ∅; we want to show that Bt3(ω) = Bt1(ω)∩It3(ω)
(this is Property CAB). By local rationalizability, there exists a total pre-order R
of   such that Bt1(ω) = bestR It1(ω)
def
= {ω ∈ It1(ω) : ωRω′, ∀ω′ ∈ It1(ω)}
and Bt3(ω) = bestR It3(ω)
def
= {ω ∈ It3(ω) : ωRω′, ∀ω′ ∈ It3(ω)}. Since,
by hypothesis, It3(ω) ⊆ It1(ω) and Bt1(ω) ∩ It3(ω)  = ∅, bestR It3(ω) =
bestR It1(ω) ∩ It3(ω). Hence Bt3(ω) = Bt1(ω) ∩ It3(ω).
Next we show that Property CAB, together with the Qualitative Bayes Rule
(QBR) implies Property REFweak. Fix ω ∈   and t,t1,t2,t3 ∈ T such that
t ֌ t1 ֌ t2 and t ֌ t3 and suppose that It3(ω) = It2(ω) ⊆ It1(ω) and
Bt1(ω) ∩ It2(ω)  = ∅. By QBR, since Bt1(ω) ∩ It2(ω)  = ∅, Bt2(ω) = Bt1(ω) ∩
It2(ω). Since It3(ω) = It2(ω), Bt1(ω)∩It3(ω)  = ∅ and thus, by Property CAB,
since It3(ω) ⊆ It1(ω), Bt3(ω) = Bt1(ω) ∩ It3(ω). Hence Bt2(ω) = Bt3(ω).
Proof of Lemma 12. Fix arbitrary h′ ∈ H, K′ ∈ K and φ,ψ ∈ Φ. By AGM3
and AGM4, if ¬ψ / ∈ K′ then B(h′,K′,ψ) = [K′ ∪ {ψ}]
PL. Thus, letting h′ = hφ
and K′ = B(h,K,φ) we get
if ¬ψ / ∈ B(h,K,φ) then B(hφ,B(h,K,φ),ψ) = [B(h,K,φ) ∪ {ψ}]
PL .
(34)
By AGM7 and AGM8,
if ¬ψ / ∈ B(h,K,φ), then [B(h,K,φ) ∪ {ψ}]
PL = B(h,K,φ ∧ ψ). (35)
Thus, by (34) and (35), if ¬ψ / ∈ B(h,K,φ), B(hφ,B(h,K,φ),ψ) = B(h,K,φ∧
ψ).
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